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Abstract
Despite explicitly wanting to quit, long-term addicts find themselves powerless to resist drugs, despite knowing that drug-
taking may be a harmful course of action. Such inconsistency between the explicit knowledge of negative consequences
and the compulsive behavioral patterns represents a cognitive/behavioral conflict that is a central characteristic of
addiction. Neurobiologically, differential cue-induced activity in distinct striatal subregions, as well as the dopamine
connectivity spiraling from ventral striatal regions to the dorsal regions, play critical roles in compulsive drug seeking.
However, the functional mechanism that integrates these neuropharmacological observations with the above-mentioned
cognitive/behavioral conflict is unknown. Here we provide a formal computational explanation for the drug-induced
cognitive inconsistency that is apparent in the addicts’ ‘‘self-described mistake’’. We show that addictive drugs gradually
produce a motivational bias toward drug-seeking at low-level habitual decision processes, despite the low abstract
cognitive valuation of this behavior. This pathology emerges within the hierarchical reinforcement learning framework
when chronic exposure to the drug pharmacologically produces pathologicaly persistent phasic dopamine signals. Thereby
the drug hijacks the dopaminergic spirals that cascade the reinforcement signals down the ventro-dorsal cortico-striatal
hierarchy. Neurobiologically, our theory accounts for rapid development of drug cue-elicited dopamine efflux in the ventral
striatum and a delayed response in the dorsal striatum. Our theory also shows how this response pattern depends critically
on the dopamine spiraling circuitry. Behaviorally, our framework explains gradual insensitivity of drug-seeking to drug-
associated punishments, the blocking phenomenon for drug outcomes, and the persistent preference for drugs over natural
rewards by addicts. The model suggests testable predictions and beyond that, sets the stage for a view of addiction as a
pathology of hierarchical decision-making processes. This view is complementary to the traditional interpretation of
addiction as interaction between habitual and goal-directed decision systems.
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Introduction
‘‘We admitted we were powerless over our addiction—that our
lives had become unmanageable’’ states the very first tenet of the
Narcotics Anonymous 12-step program [1]. This spotlights how
powerless addicts find themselves when it comes to resisting drugs,
despite knowing that drug-taking is a wrong course of action [2–4].
In fact, the hallmark of addiction is compulsive seeking of the
drugs even at the cost of evident adverse consequences [5]. A
signature of such pathological behavior becomes evident in
controlled experiments where addicts exhibit a characteristic
‘‘self-described mistake’’: an inconsistency between the potent
behavioral response toward drug-associated choices and the
relatively low subjective value that the addict reports for the drug
[4,6,7]. When combined with the loss of inhibitory cognitive
control over behavior, after protracted exposure to drugs, this
divergence between the cognitive plans and the consolidated
habits may result in a transition from casual to compulsive drug-
seeking behavior [8].
The loss of cognitive control and self-described mistake have so
far eluded a principled explanation by formal models of addiction
[9–13]. Previous computational theories of drug addiction, mostly
posed within the reinforcement learning framework, view addic-
tion as a pathological state of the habit learning (stimulus-response)
system [9–13]. The central hypothesis behind all those models is
that the pharmacological effect of drugs on dopamine signaling,
supposedly carrying a stimulus-response teaching signal, results in
gradual over-reinforcement of such associations. This effect in turn
leads to compulsive drug-seeking habits. While this reduced view
of addiction has captured some aspects of the phenomenon, a
growing consensus in the addiction literature indicates that
multiple learning systems are involved in the pathology. Only
such a more complex picture that includes brain’s cognitive, as
well as low-level habitual processes, can explain the variety of
addiction-like behaviors [8,14].
In this paper, we adopt a hierarchical reinforcement learning
approach [15] where decisions are represented at different levels of
abstraction, in a cognitive-to-motor hierarchy. We assume that a
cascade of dopamine-dependent learning signals links levels of the
hierarchy together [16]. We further assume that drugs of abuse
pharmacologically hijack the communication mechanism between
levels of abstraction. Based on these assumptions, we show that the
reported cognitive dissonance in addicts emerges within the
hierarchical reinforcement learning framework when chronic
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drug-exposure disrupts value-learning across the decision hierar-
chy. This disruption results in a pathological over-valuation of
drug choices at low-level habitual processes and hence drives
habitual drug-seeking behavior. We then demonstrate that
‘‘disliked’’ but compulsive drug-seeking can be explained as
drug-hijacked low-level habitual processes dominating behavior,
while healthy cognitive systems at the top representational levels
lose control over behavior. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the
proposed model can account for recent evidence on rapid vs.
delayed development of drug cue-elicited dopamine efflux in the
ventral vs. dorsal striatum, respectively, as well as the dependence
of this pattern on dopamine spiraling circuitry.
Materials and Methods
Preliminaries
In concordance with a rich cognitive psychology literature, our
hierarchical reinforcement learning [15,18] framework assumes
that an abstract cognitive plan like ‘‘brewing tea’’ can be broken
into a sequence of lower-level actions: boiling water, putting tea in
the pot, etc. Such decomposition proceeds until concrete motor-
level responses at the lowest level of the hierarchy (Figure 1A).
Neurobiologically, the different levels of decision hierarchy from
cognitive to motor levels are represented along the rostro-caudal
axis of the cortico-basal ganglia (BG) circuit [19–21]. This circuit is
composed of several parallel closed loops between the frontal
cortex and the basal ganglia [22,23] (Figure 1B). Whereas the
anterior loops underlie more abstract representation of actions, the
caudal loops, consisting of sensory-motor cortex and dorsolateral
striatum, encode low-level habits [19–21].
Within this circuitry, the phasic activity of midbrain dopamine
(DA) neurons projecting to the striatum signals the error between
predicted and received rewards, thereby carrying stimulus-
response reinforcing information [24]. These DAergic projections
form a cascading serial connectivity linking the more ventral
regions of the striatum to progressively more dorsal regions
through the so-called 0spiraling0 connections [25–27] (Figure 1B).
Functionally, such feed-forward organization connecting the
rostral to caudal cortico-BG loops allows directed coupling from
coarse to fine representations. Accordingly, the DA spirals are
hypothesized to provide a neurobiological substrate for the
progressive tuning of the reward prediction error by the higher
levels of the hierarchy (encoding the abstract knowledge about the
value of behavioral options). This error is then utilized for
updating action-values at more detailed levels [16]. In other
words, the DA spirals allow for the abstract cognitive levels of
valuation to guide the learning in the more detailed action-
valuation processes.
Theory sketch
In terms of the computational theory of reinforcement learning
[28] (RL), the agent (in our case a person or an animal) learns to
make informed action-choices by updating its prior estimated
value, Q(st,at), for each state-action pair, (st,at), when a reward rt
is received by the agent at time t as a result of performing an
action at in the contextual state (stimulus) st. The value Q(st,at) is
updated by computing the reward prediction error signal. This
signal not only depends on the instantaneously received reward
(rt), but also on the value of the new state the agent ends up in,
after that action has been performed. Denoted by V (stz1), this
temporally-advanced value-function represents the sum of future
rewards the animal expects to receive from the resultant state,
stz1, onward. The prediction error can be computed by the
following equation:
dt~rtzV (stz1){Q(st,at) ð1Þ
Intuitively, the prediction error signal computes the discrepancy
between the expected and the realized rewarding value of an
action. In a hierarchical decision structure, however, rather than
learning the Q-values independently at different levels, more
abstract levels can tune the teaching signal computed at lower
levels. Since higher levels of the hierarchy represent a more
abstract representation of environmental contingencies, learning
occurs faster in those levels. This is due to the relative low-
dimensionality of the abstract representation of behavior: an
action plan can be represented as a single step (one dimension) at
the top level of the hierarchy and as multiple detailed actions
(multiple dimensions) at the lower levels of the hierarchy. The top
level value of this action-plan would be learned quickly as
compared to the detailed levels where the reward errors would
need to back-propagate all the detailed action-steps. Thus, tuning
the lower level values by the value information from the higher
levels can speed up the convergence of these values. One
statistically efficient way of doing so is to suppose that for
computing the prediction error signal at the n-th level of
abstraction, dnt , the temporally-advanced value function,
V (sntz1), comes from one higher level of abstraction, nz1 [16]:
dnt~r
n
tzV
nz1(snz1tz1 ){Q
n(snt ,a
n
t ) ð2Þ
To preserve optimality, equation 2 can be used for computing
the prediction error only when the last constituent primitive action
of an abstract option is performed (see Figure S1 in File S1). In
other cases, value-learning at different levels occur independently,
as in equation 1. In both cases, the teaching signal is then used for
updating the prior values at the corresponding level:
Qn(snt ,a
n
t )/Q
n(snt ,a
n
t )za:d
n
t ð3Þ
where a is the learning rate. This form of inter-level information-
sharing is biologically plausible since it reflects the spiraling
structure of the DA circuitry, carrying the information down the
hierarchy in the ventro-dorsal direction. At the same time, being
guided by more abstract levels significantly accelerates learning,
alleviating the high-dimensionality of value learning at detailed
levels [16].
In this paper we show that the interaction between a modified
version of the model developed in [16] and the specific
pharmacological effects of drugs of abuse on the dopaminergic
system can capture addiction-related data at radically different
scales of analysis: behavioral and circuit-level neurobiological.
First, the new model brings about a possible cogent explanation for
several intriguing behavioral aspects associated with addiction to
drugs (e.g. the self-described mistake [4,6,7]). Second, we can
account for a wide range of evidence regarding the dynamics of
the drug-evoked dopamine release [17].
We modify the model presented in [16] as follows. We make the
model more efficient in terms of working memory capacity by
replacing Vnz1(snz1tz1 ) with Q
nz1(snz1t ,a
nz1
t ){r
nz1
t , in equation
2, since the two values converge to the same steady level (see
Figure S2 in File S1, for computational and neurobiological basis):
Hijacked Decision Hierarchy in Addicts
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dnt~r
n
tzQ
nz1(snz1t ,a
nz1
t ){r
nz1
t {Q
n(snt ,a
n
t ) ð4Þ
Here, anz1t is the relatively abstract option and a
n
t is the last
primitive action in the behavioral sequence that full-fills this
option. Similarly,rnz1t is the rewarding value of a
nz1
t , which
includes rnt (the rewarding value of a
n
t ).
Crucially, the various drugs abused by humans share a
fundamental property of pharmacologically increasing dopamine
concentration within the striatum [29]. Accordingly, we incorpo-
rate this pharmacological effect of the drug by adding a positive
bias, D, (see also [9–12]) to the prediction error signal carried by
dopamine neurons (see Figure S3 in File S1, for computational
and neurobiological basis):
Figure 1. Hierarchical organization of behavior and the cortico-BG circuit. A, An example of a decision hierarchy for two alternative choices:
drug vs. food. Each course of action is represented at different levels of abstraction, supposedly encoded at different cortico-BG loops. Seeking each
of the two types of reward might follow a punishment of magnitude 16. B, Glutamatergic connections from different prefrontal areas project to
striatal subregions and then project back to the PFC through the pallidum and thalamus, forming several parallel loops. Through the striato-nigro-
striatal dopamine network, the ventral regions of the striatum influence the more dorsal regions. vmPFC, ventral medial prefrontal cortex; OFC, orbital
frontal cortex; dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; SMC, sensory-motor cortex; VTA, ventral tegmental area; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta.
Figure 1B Modified from ref 21.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061489.g001
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dnt~r
n
tzQ
nz1(snz1t ,a
nz1
t ){r
nz1
t {Q
n(snt ,a
n
t )zD ð5Þ
Here D captures the direct pharmacological effect of drug on
the DA system, and rt is its reinforcing value due to the
euphorigenic effects (see File S1 for supplementary information).
While equations 3 and 5 together define the computational
mechanism to update the values in our model, we also hypothesize
that an uncertainty-based competition mechanism determines the
level of abstraction that controls behavior. This is inspired by the
mechanism proposed in [29] for arbitration between the habitual
and goal-directed systems. In this respect, at each decision point,
only the level of abstraction with the highest certainty in estimating
the value of choices controls behavior. Once this level has made
the decision to act, all the lower levels of the hierarchy will be
deployed by this dominant level to implement the selected action
as a sequence of primitive motor responses (see File S1 for
supplementary information; Figure S4 in File S1; Figure S5 in File
S1). Upon receiving the reward feedback from the environment,
the values at all the levels are updated. This uncertainty-based
arbitration mechanism predicts that as abstract processes are more
flexible, they have superior value-approximation capability during
the early stages of learning and thus, control behavior at these
stages. However, since the abstract levels use a coarse represen-
tation of the environment (e.g. due to containing a relatively small
number of basis functions), their ultimate value approximation
capability is not as precise as those of detailed levels. In other
words, after extensive training the certainty associated with the
estimated values is lower for the lower levels of the hierarchy as
compared to the upper levels. Thus, with progressive learning, the
lower levels of the hierarchy take over the control over the action
selection, as their uncertainty decreases gradually. This is in
agreement with several lines of evidence showing a progressive
dominance of the dorsal over the ventral striatum in the control
over drug-seeking (as well as seeking natural rewards) [8,30,31].
Results
Hierarchy valuation inconsistency emerges under drug
but not natural rewards
In contrast to the previous reinforcement learning-based
computational models of addiction [9–13] which are based on a
single-decision-system approach, our account is build upon a
multiple-interacting-systems framework. As a result, although the
form of modeling drug’s effect on the prediction error signal in our
model is similar to the previous ones [9–12], it results in
fundamentally different consequences. The drug-induced transient
dopamine increase boosts the immediate prediction error at each
level of the hierarchy and as a result, entrains a bias, D, on the
transfer of knowledge from one level of abstraction to the next,
along the coarse-to-fine direction of the hierarchy. This bias causes
the asymptotic value of drug-seeking at a given level to be D units
higher than that of one more abstract layer (Figure 2B). The
accumulation of these discrepancies along the rostro-caudal axis
progressively induces significant differences in the value of drug-
seeking behaviors between the top and bottom extremes of the
hierarchy. Thus, even when followed by a strong punishment, the
value of drug-associated behavior remains positive at the low-level
motor loops, while it becomes negative at cognitive levels. In other
words, the model predicts that accumulation of drug effect over
DA spirals increases drug-seeking value at motor-level habits to
such high amplitude that even a strong natural punishment will
not be able to decrease it sufficiently. We suggest that this explains
the inconsistency between cognitive and low-level evaluation of
drug-related behaviors in addicts. In other words, we propose that
compulsive drug seeking and the significantly reduced elasticity to
associated costs stems from the pharmacological effect of the drug
hijacking the dopamine-dependent mechanism that transfers the
information among the levels of decision hierarchy.
While drugs, in our model, result in imbalanced valuation
across levels, the value of natural rewards converges to the same
value across all levels, due to lack of a direct pharmacological effect
on DA signaling mechanism (D~0). Consequently, neither
inconsistency nor overvaluation at detailed levels will be observed
for the case of natural rewards (Figure 2A). Overvaluation of drug-
seeking responses at lower levels of the hierarchy should result in
abnormal preference of drugs over natural rewards, and over-
engagement in drug-related activities.
Differential dopamine responding in the ventral versus
dorsal striatum to drug-associated cues
Neurobiologically, differential roles of the striatal subregions in
the acquisition and expression of drug-seeking behavior has taken
center stage in addiction research. Converging evidence from
different lines of research suggests that the behavioral transition
from recreational to compulsive drug use reflects a neurobiological
shift of valuation from the ventral to the dorsolateral striatum
[8,33,34], corresponding to a shift from cognitive to detailed levels
in our model. Consistent with our model, DA spiraling network
connecting the ventral to progressively more dorsal regions of the
striatum is shown to play a pivotal role in this transition [25].
In a key recent study Willuhn et al. [17] assessed the pattern of
dopamine release in response to drug-associated cues in the ventral
and dorsolateral striatum of rats during three weeks of experienc-
ing cocaine. Using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry, the critical
observation was that cue-induced DA efflux in the ventral striatum
emerges even after very limited training. In contrast, the
dorsolateral striatum showed cue-triggered DA efflux only after
extensive training, and the development of this release pattern
disappeared when the ventral striatum was lesioned in the
ipsilateral hemisphere.
Since the temporal resolution of fast-scan voltammetry captures
subsecond fluctuations in concentration, the observed pattern of
DA efflux should be attributed to ‘‘phasic’’ DA signaling and thus,
to the prediction error signal, according to the RL theory of
dopamine [24]. According to RL theory, the prediction error
signal upon observing an unexpected stimulus is equal to the
rewarding value that that stimulus predicts. Therefore, cue-
induced DA release is equivalent to the value predicted by that
cue.
In this respect, our hierarchical framework provides a formal
explanation for the differential pattern of ventral versus dorsal
striatal DA efflux reported in [17]. The value predicted by the
drug-associated cue at the abstract cognitive levels of the hierarchy
increases rapidly at the very early stages of training (Figure 2B),
due to low-dimensionality of the learning problem at high levels of
abstraction. As a result, our model shows that the cue-induced DA
efflux should be observed in the ventral striatum even after limited
training (Figure 3). At the more detailed levels of representation,
however, the learning process is slow (Figure 2B), due to high-
dimensionality of the problem space, as well as dependency of
learning on more abstract levels through DA spirals. Consequent-
ly, cue-induced DA efflux in the dorsolateral striatum should
develop gradually and become observable only after extensive
training (Figure 3).
Hijacked Decision Hierarchy in Addicts
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Figure 2. Motivation for food vs. drug at different levels of abstraction (simulation results). In the first 150 trials where no punishment
follows the reward, the value of seeking natural rewards at all levels converge to 10 (A). For the case of drug, however, the direct pharmacological
effect of drug (D, set to2) results in the asymptotic value at each level to beD units higher than that of one higher level of abstraction (B). Thus, when
followed by punishment, whereas cognitive loops correctly assign a negative value to drug-seeking choice, motor-level loops find drug-seeking
desirable (positive value). The curves in this figure show the evolution of values in ‘‘one’’ simulated animal and thus, no statistical analysis was
applicable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061489.g002
Figure 3. Dopamine efflux at different striatal subregions in response to drug-associated cues (simulation results). In line with
experimental data [17], the model shows (left column) that in response to drug-associated cues, there will be dopamine efflux in the ventral striatum,
after limited and extensive training. In more dorsolateral subregions, however, cue-elicited DA efflux will develop gradually during the course of
learning. The model predicts (second column from right) that this delayed development of cue-elicited DA efflux in dorsal striatum depends on the
DA-dependent serial connectivity that links the ventral to the dorsal striatum. That is, as a result of disconnecting the DA spirals, whereas cue-elicited
DA response remains intact in the ventral striatum, it significantly decreases in the dorsolateral striatum. Moreover, the model predicts (third column
from right) similar results for cue-induced DA efflux in dorsolateral striatum for the case of lesioned ventral striatum. Finally, if after extensive drug-
cue pairing in intact animals, a punishment follows drug, the model predicts (right column) that drug-related cue results in inhibition of the ventral
leg of DA spirals, even after limited training. In more dorsal regions, however, DA efflux decreases slowly during learning, but will remain positive,
even after extensive drug-punishment pairing. The data presented in this figure are obtained from ‘‘one’’ simulated animal and thus, no statistical
analysis was applicable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061489.g003
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Furthermore, our model explains the evidence in [17] that such
delayed development of cue-elicited DA efflux in the dorsolateral
striatum depends on the ventral striatum (Figure 3). In our model,
a simulated unilateral lesion of the ventral striatum (the abstract
valuation level in the model) significantly decreases the drug cue-
predicted value at detailed levels in the ipsilateral hemisphere and
thus, significantly decreases the level of cue-induced DA efflux. In
order to model lesion of the ventral striatum, we simply fix the
value of all stimuli at the highest level of the hierarchy to zero.
Similarly, our model predicts that the development of phasic
DA signaling in the dorsolateral striatum depends on the integrity
of the DA spiraling circuit (Figure 3). In fact, a disconnection in
the DA spiraling circuit in our model cuts the communication
across levels of abstraction, which in turn, prevents accumulation
of the drug-induced bias on the reinforcement signal, along the
levels of decision hierarchy. To model the disconnection in the
DA-dependent serial circuitry of ventral to dorsal striatum, we
clamp each level of abstraction to compute the prediction error
signal locally (as in equation 3), without receiving the value of the
temporally advanced state from the immediately higher level of
abstraction.
Furthermore, the model predicts that the pattern of cue-elicited
DA efflux will change if after an extensive training with cocaine
and cocaine associated cues, as in the above experiment, one starts
to pair the cocaine delivery with a strong punishment. We predict
that the DA efflux in response to the cocaine-associated cue should
rapidly decrease below baseline in the ventral striatum. In the
dorsolateral striatum, however, cue-induced DA release should
stay above baseline (Figure 3) with a possible delayed partial
decrease. This indicates assigning positive subjective value to the
drug stimulus at detailed levels, despite negative (below baseline)
values at cognitive levels. It is noteworthy that this prediction
depends on the assumption that punishment is treated by the brain
simply as a negative reward. This assumption is somewhat
controversial: it is clearly supported by experimental studies
[35], yet also discussed otherwise by others [14,36]. Except for this
prediction, other aspects of the model do not depend on whether
punishment is encoded by dopamine or by another signaling
system.
The training regimen used by Willuhn et al. [34] is not
sufficiently extended to producing compulsive drug-seeking
behavior, characterized by insensitivity to drug-associated punish-
ments [37,38]. Thus, a key question to be answered is what is the
relation between delayed development of cue-induced DA
response in DLS, and late development of compulsive responding.
According to our model, compulsive behavior requires not only
the excessive valuation of drug choice at low levels of the
hierarchy, but also the transfer of control over behavior from the
abstract cognitive to the low-level habitual processes. The time
scale of these two processes are only partly dependent to each
other: the over-valuation process depends on the prediction error
signal, while the transfer of behavioral control also depends on the
relative uncertainties in value-estimation. Hence, the over-
valuation of drug-associated cues at low levels of the hierarchy
can precede the shift of control over behavior from top to the
bottom of the hierarchy. The exact time scales of the two processes
depend on the learning rate and the noise inherent at the different
levels, respectively (see File S1 for supplementary information). In
other words, it is likely that the cue-induced dopamine efflux in the
DLS may develop significantly before the compulsive drug-seeking
is behaviorally manifested.
Behavioral implications of the inconsistent valuation for
drugs versus natural rewards
Behaviorally, in our model, if punishment is paired with drug at
the early stages of voluntary drug use, the abstract value of drug-
seeking response becomes negative rapidly. Assuming that drug-
seeking is controlled by abstract levels during these early stages,
negative abstract evaluation of drug choice makes the subject
unwilling to experience that course of action any longer. This will
prevent consolidation of strong low-level preference toward drugs
over time. Thus, the model explains elasticity of drug choices to
costs during the early stages of drug consumption, but not after
chronic use. Consistently, animal models of addiction show that
insensitivity of drug-seeking responses to harmful consequences
associated with drug develops only after prolonged drug self-
administration, but not limited drug use [37,38]. In contrast to our
theory, earlier computational models of addiction [9,10] are in
direct contradiction with this body of evidence, since they predict
that adverse behavioral outcomes that immediately follow drug
use, have no motivational effect even at the very early stages of
experiencing drugs (see File S1 for supplementary information).
Our model further accounts for the occurrence of blocking
effect for drug outcomes [39]. Blocking is a conditioning
phenomenon where prior pairing of a stimulus A with an outcome
blocks formation of association between a different stimulus B with
that outcome in a subsequent training phase, where both A and B
are presented before the delivery of the outcome [40]. Results of
simulating our model in a Pavlovian experimental design (see File
S1 for supplementary information on the Pavlovian version of the
model) shows that for both cases of natural rewards and drugs,
when the estimated value at a certain level of the hierarchy reaches
its steady state (rather than growing unboundedly), no further
learning occurs at that level, since the prediction error signal has
decreased to zero (Figure 4). Thus, associating a new stimulus with
the already-predicted reward will be blocked. Behavioral evidence
showing a blocking effect associated with both drug and natural
reinforcers [39] has been used as a major argument to criticize the
previously proposed dopamine-based computational model of
addiction [9]. Here we showed that focusing on the hierarchical
nature of representations and dorsal-ventral spiraling dopamine
loop organization can in fact account for the blocking data,
thereby circumventing this criticism (see File S1 for supplementary
information).
As mentioned before, several lines of evidence show a
progressive dominance of the dorsal over the ventral striatum in
the control over behavior during the course of learning [8,31,32].
Being interpreted on a background of those evidence, the
imbalanced drug-seeking valuation across the hierarchy also
explains addicts’ unsuccessful efforts to cut down drug-use after
prolonged experience with drug, when control over drug-related
choices has shifted from cognitive to low-level habitual processes.
This supremacy of drug-dominated processes naturally leads to
behavioral inelasticity to drug-associated costs (compulsive drug-
seeking), likely accompanied with self-described mistake. For the
case of natural rewards, however, our model predicts that even
though behavioral inelasticity increases over the course of
learning, as no valuation-inconsistency develops across the levels
of the hierarchy, punishments associated with reward will
eventually inhibit reward-seeking.
Our model focuses on evaluation of actions in a ‘‘presumably
given’’ decision hierarchy, and leaves aside how the abstract
options and their corresponding low-level subroutines are initially
discovered during development. Discovering the decision hierar-
chy is proposed to be a bottom-up process, accomplished by
chunking together sequences of low-level actions and constructing
Hijacked Decision Hierarchy in Addicts
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more abstract options [41]. This process, supposedly undergoing a
shift from the dorsal to the ventral striatum, is in the opposite
direction of the competition mechanism proposed here, for taking
control over behavior.
Discussion
The growing body of evidence on the differential role of
different striatal subregions in addiction is usually interpreted in
the framework of habitual vs. goal-directed dichotomy [8,14,34].
The hierarchical decision making approach we use here is
complementary to such dual-system accounts. Whereas the dual-
process approach deals with different algorithms (model-free vs.
model-base [30]) for solving a single problem, the hierarchical RL
framework focuses on different representations of the same
problem at different levels of temporal abstraction. In theory,
either a habitual or a goal-directed algorithm can solve each of
these different representations of the problem. In our model, the
accumulation of drug-induced biases over DA spirals occurs in a
setting where the value-estimation algorithm is model-free (habit
learning). However, this does not rule out existence of model-
based systems working at the top levels of the hierarchy. One can
simply incorporate the PFC-dependent goal-directed valuation
and decision system into the model by assuming that actions at the
highest levels of abstraction are evaluated by a goal-directed
system. While such complication does not change the nature of
results presented in this manuscript, its ensuing additional
flexibility in explaining other aspect of addiction is left to future
studies. In fact, in our model, irrespective of whether a goal-direct
system exists or not, the discrepancy in the asymptotic value of
drug-seeking between the two extremes of the hierarchy grows
with the number of decision levels governed by the ‘‘habitual’’
process.
In the light of our theory, relapse can be viewed as revival of
dormant motor-level maladaptive habits, after a period of
dominance of cognitive levels. In fact, one can imagine that as a
result of cognitive therapy (in human addicts) or forced extinction
(in animal models of abstinence), high value of drug-seeking at the
detailed level of the hierarchy is not extinguished, but become
dormant due to shift of control back to cognitive levels. Since drug-
related behavior is sensitive to adverse consequences at abstract
levels, hence drug-seeking can be avoided as long as high-level
cognitive processes dominate control of behavior. One can even
speculate that the popular 12 step programs (e.g. Alcoholics
Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, etc) work in part by explicitly
requiring the participants to admit the inconsistency of their drug
related lifestyle, thereby empowering the abstract cognitive levels
to exert explicit control over their behavior. Stressful conditions or
re-exposure to drug (priming) can be thought of as risk factors that
weaken the dominance of abstract levels over behavior, which can
result in re-emergence of drug-seeking responses (due to the latent
high non-cognitive values).
In summary, we propose a coherent account for several,
apparently disparate phenomena characteristic of drug addiction.
Our model provides a normative account for data on the
differential roles of the ventral vs. dorsal striatal circuits in drug-
seeking acquisition and habit performance, as well as the selective
role of feed-forward DA connectivity for effects of drug versus
natural reinforcers. Most importantly, we show how the drug-
induced pathology in ventral-to-dorsal DA signals trickling the
motivational information down cognitive representation hierarchy
could leads to discordance between addicts’ abstract attitudes
toward drug-seeking and what they actually do. Obviously, our
model does not, and is not meant to, give a complete account of
drug addiction. Explaining other unexplained aspects of addiction
requires incorporating many other brain systems that are
demonstrated to be affected by drugs of abuse [42]. How to
incorporate such systems within the formal computational network
remains a topic for further investigation.
Supporting Information
File S1 Figure S1,A sample decision hierarchy with five levels of
abstraction. Figure S2, The corresponding neural circuit for the
three discussed value learning algorithms is a hierarchical decision
structure. A, Using a simple TD-learning algorithm (equation S7),
the prediction error signal in each level of abstraction is computed
independently from other levels. B, In the model proposed by
Haruno and Kawato (4) (equation S8), the value of the temporally-
advanced state comes from one higher level of abstraction. C, in
our model (equation S9) the value of the temporally-advanced
state is substituted with a combination of the reward and Q-value
Figure 4. Blocking effect for natural vs. drug rewards. The model predicts that blocking occurs for natural rewards (A) and drugs (B), only if
the initial training period is ‘‘extensive’’, such that the first stimulus fully predicts the value of the outcome. After ‘‘moderate’’ training, cognitive levels
that are more flexible fully predict the values and thus, block further learning. However, learning is still active in low-level processes when the second
training phase (simultaneous presentation of both stimuli) starts. Thus, our model predicts that moderate initial training in a blocking experiment
with natural rewards will also result in cognitive/behavioral inconsistency. The data presented in this figure are obtained from ‘‘one’’ simulated animal
and thus, no statistical analysis was applicable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061489.g004
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of the performed action at a higher level of abstraction. Figure
S3, Our model predicts different sites of action of drugs on the
reward-learning circuit: sites 1 to 3. Drugs affecting sites 4 to 6, in
contrast, will not result in the behavioral and neurobiological
patterns produced by simulation of the model for drugs, but will
produce results similar to the case of natural rewards. Figure S4,
The task used for simulating the uncertainty-based competition
mechanism among the levels of the hierarchy for taking control
over behavior. Figure S5, Simulation result, showing gradual
shift of control over behavior from higher to lower levels of the
hierarchy. Q(s,a) and U(s,a) show the estimated value and
uncertainty of the state-action pairs, respectively.
(PDF)
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